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Morality and God
My topic today is the connection between morality as we are fa-
miliar with it in our culture and, on the other hand, the beliefs and
practices of traditional Christianity. My thesis is that morality in the
tradition made sense against the background of a set of theological
premises, and that in elite Western culture these premises have now
been largely abandoned. The result is, I will claim, that morality no
longer makes sense in the way it did. There are three problem areas in
particular that I will stress. The first is the gap between the moral de-
mand on us and our natural capacities to meet it. The second is the
source of the authority of morality. The third is whether a commit-
ment to morality is consistent with our own long-term happiness.
One good place to begin is the moral theory of Immanuel Kant,
who lived in Prussia at the end of the eighteenth century. He is, as I
see it, the dominant figure in Modem Western philosophy, not just in
Ethics (though that is what I will talk about today). Ethical theory
since Kant has been a succession of attempts either to recover his sys-
tem or to reject it in the light of new conceptual circumstances. What
I want to claim is that Kant still understands the dependence on Chris-
tian doctrine. And he sees that his system cannot work if this doctrine
is discarded. His successors have tried to do Kantian theory without
this doctrine. If! am right about Kant, we can then look to see ifhis
successors have provided any substitute which can do the work which
Kant needed Christian doctrine to do for him. If not, then their sys-
tems will be defective for just the reasons Kant described.
The interpretation of Kant in this area is controversial. What has
happened in the secondary interpretive literature of the twentieth cen-
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tury is that the Christian references in the great classics of modem
philosophy have been systematically down played or ignored or ex-
cluded. If you think religious commitments are nonsense yourself, it
is tempting to weed them out of your favorite authors. But it leads to
distortion none the less. Thus we are told by a contemporary Kant
scholar (Lewis White Beck) that whole sections of the First Critique,
where Kant sounds theist, are only there because of clumsy editing,
and that if Kant had been more careful he would have left them out.
Or we are told that Kant is afraid of the Prussian censor, (Wood)
'Kant's statement of his argument seems encumbered with a certain
tact, or even fear, which makes him reluctant to express with perfect
candor what he really thinks.' All of these interpretations end up with
Kant rejecting traditional belief, but saying what he did not really
mean for reasons of carelessness or self-protection. I do not deny that
this is possible. But this kind of interpretation should be a technique
of last resort, if there is no other way to make sense of the text. In the
case of Kant, there is a good way to make sense of these texts in
which I will be referring to, if we suppose that Kant is quite sincere in
what I shall call 'the vertical dimension' of his moral philosophy. He
genuinely believes that the moral life makes no sense without God.
I will proceed by taking the three areas I listed in which I see an
important connection between the practice of morality as we are fa-
miliar with it and the Christian religion. The first of these areas is
what I call 'the moral gap'. This is the gap between the moral demand
on us and our natural capacities to live by it. Morality is seen, in this
picture, as a three-part structure, of which the first two parts are the
moral demand and our natural capacity and the third is a possible be-
ing who can live by the demand and who is its source. I will start by
3
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saying something about the nature of the demand. The center of the
demand, as Kant sees it, is the requirement of impartial benevolence.
This is not the whole of morality, but it is the heart of it. Kant gives
various forms of what he claims is the supreme principle of morality,
and I will mention two. When an agent proposes an action to herself,
she does it with some account to herself of the reason why she should
do it. Kant says that ifher action is going to be morally permissible,
she has to be willing to propose that anyone in her kind of situation
should do that kind of action for that kind of reason. That would turn
her proposal into a universal law for what should be done in such cir-
cumstances. Let me give you an example to make this clearer. Sup-
pose she is a college professor, it is January and she has a huge stack
of student papers to grade. Suppose she hates grading papers, she
hates January in Michigan, and the thought occurs to her that she
could leave the papers and fly to the Bahamas for a few days and soak
in the sun. Then when she gets home she can take the whole pile of
papers up to the top of the stairs and throw them down, and any paper
which gets on the bottom step gets and A, and on the next step and A-
and on the next step a B+, and so on. She could save herself hours and
hours oftime and have a lovely weekend. Now the question is
whether this action together with this motivation is morally permissi-
ble.
Kant says no, because she will fmd that she cannot will that any-
one in such a situation should act so. Consider the hypothetical situa-
tion in which she is not the professor, but one of the students, perhaps
one of the students whose admission to medical school is in the bal-
ance, depending on his cumulative average, and who has just put
hours and hours into this paper as a result. Can she will for this situa-
4
The Center for the Study of Ethics in Society, Vol. 13 No.2
tion that the professor grade the papers in this haphazard way? She
cannot. What this Kantian test does is to require that any reference to
a particular person, including herself, is eliminated. If she is willing
the action for anyone in a certain kind of situation, she cannot pre-
serve reference to herself or any other individual. So she has to will
that the same action should be done if the particular people in her par-
ticular situation were to reverse their roles: if she were to become the
student and the student were to become the professor. Kant's princi-
ple is thus a version of the golden rule that we should do to others
only what we wish they should do to us. But Kant's version has this
additional feature that it connects with the nature of reason itself. For
it is the nature of reason in all its employments to seek the universal.
In science, for example, reason looks for the universal law. It is not
interested in whether this particular podium would make a particular
sound if a particular lecturer pushed it over. Rather, science wants to
discover the universal law governing the sound made by objects of a
certain mass falling with a certain velocity onto surfaces of a certain
structure. Kant tells us that reason is the same in moral life: it wants
to discover the universal law governing situations of the kind we are
in and what we should do in them.
So this is the first version of the supreme principle of morality.
The second version is that we should treat humanity, whether in our-
selves or anyone else, always at the same time as an end and never
merely as a means. Kant goes on to explain that to treat another per-
son as an end in herself is to share her goals and purposes as far as the
moral law allows. He is not saying that I am forbidden to use another
person for my purposes, as you are using me for your education. But
he is saying I am forbidden to use another person merely for ll\Y pur-
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poses. For example, you are at a restaurant and the waitress brings
you your food. Do you think of her merely as a kind of conveyer belt
on legs, to get the food from the kitchen to your table? Or do you
consider that she too is a person, with goals and purposes of her own.
She may be tired and she may have had a long day facing grouchy
people like you. To treat her as an end is to share her purposes, that is,
to make her purposes your purposes, as far as the moral law allows.
She wants a friendly face, though not too friendly. Is there something
morally wrong about this? No, then you should want to give it to her.
Note that you have to treat humanity this way also in your own per-
son. Kant is not saying that you treat yourself as a doormat, a mere
means to supply other people's preferences. You have to respect also
yourself, as having the same worth (but morally no greater worth)
than any other human being's. To see why these two versions of the
supreme principle of morality are so demanding, consider the follow-
ing case. You are considering going to a movie for seven dollars, or
so, and it occurs to you that seven dollars could keep someone alive
for a week in, say, Zambia. You may doubt this, but there are actually
a billion people in the world who live on less than a dollar a day. I
myself lived in India for about a year, teaching, and my salary was the
equivalent of about a dollar a day, slightly less. My daughter Cather-
ine has just come back from working in Zambia for six months, where
the per capita income is $380 a year. Moreover the rate ofillV infec-
tion is about 30% and the country is full of orphans whose extended
family cannot feed their own children, let alone take in extra. Now is
the purpose of staying alive for a week morally permissible? Yes. So
you should share that person's purpose. But which is more important,
the movie or the life? If you did not know which role you were going
6
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to play in this situation, the starving child or the upwardly mobile stu-
dent, which would you choose? In Christian terms, we could put it
this way. Christ says, about feeding the hungry, 'in as far as you do it
to the least of these my brethren, you do it unto me.' So which is
more important to Christ, the movie or the life? We can come back to
this if you like after the lecture.
This, then, is the moral demand, the first part of the structure of
the moral gap. If I am right about this structure, the second part is our
natural capacities, those we were born with, and those capacities are
not adequate to the demand. Kant has a version of the traditional doc-
trine of original sin. His version goes back into the history ofthe pie-
tist Lutheranism that he grew up in. It comes to Luther through Ock-
ham and Scotus and behind him Anselm, and behind him Augustine.
The way Duns Scotus puts it is that there are two basic affections of
the will, if you like, two pulls. There is the pull towards one's own
advantage, and the pull towards what is good in itself. We humans are
born with, and will always experience both pulls. But the key moral
question is which we put first. Kant explains this in terms of duty and
happiness. Do we put duty first, and do what will make us happy only
if it is consistent with duty? Or do we put happiness first, and do our
duty only to the extent that it will make us happy? To think this sec-
ond way is to be under the evil principle, which subordinates duty to
happiness. And Kant says we are all born this way. This means we
cannot be impartial, for we put ourselves first. And this also means
that we cannot make ourselves impartial. For the evil principle, he
says, is our root principle, and if the root is corrupt it cannot heal it-
self. My experience in talking about this view to people is that some
of them think it is too pessimistic. They think, for example, th~t we
7
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are born basically good, and we do such horrible things to each other
mostly because we do not understand what we are doing. My reply to
this is to point to cases where people know perfectly well how much
they are hurting each other, but do it anyway. My wife used to super-
vise recess at an elementary school. She noticed that these children,
who had been together for several years, had established a pecking
order, like chickens in a coop; and that those at the bottom of this hi-
erarchy were bullied into a state of misery, which she thought, might
leave permanent psychological damage. My point is that the kids do-
ing this damage knew precisely how to torment those beneath them.
Or consider a dysfunctional marriage, in which the two partners have
refmed to an art-form the techniques of wounding each other. Even if
we discount what you might think are extreme cases, think again
about the movie. There are some initial responses to this dilemma.
Movies are an art form, and art has its own deep value. But suppose it
is Rocky VI? I am an interpreter of the culture, I may say, and I need
to see the movie to do this job well. But perhaps Rocky I, II, ill, IV
and V were enough? I need some relaxation, I might say, otherwise I
will grow weary with well-doing, and burn out. But am I really on the
verge of bum out when I go, and what about a walk in the woods? I
need to spend time with my family, I may say, and indeed I think I
can justify spending more resources on my own children. But is the
movie really the best way to spend time with them? I think that after
we have given all these sorts of reasons, we will realize that there is
something unjust about the way we are spending our money. And this
is not just the movie, but also the CD player, the new couch, the down
jacket. Impartiality, as Kant lays this out, turns out to make a demand
on us that we reduce significantly our standard of living. And I think
8
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the demand is too high for us by our natural capacities. I find myself
switching off when the pictures of starving children come on, because
I just cannot face it. Moreover our culture is full of devices to weaken
any inclination we originally had. The retailers in the Mall do not
want us to think about justice while we are shopping. In Grand Rap-
ids, the largest mall has just stopped even the Salvation Army from
collecting at Christmas time.
These two features of the gap-picture, namely the demand and our
defective capacities, have been repeated by most of the theorists of
morality who followed Kant. The remarkable fact is that they have
also repeated a third feature of this picture. They postulate a being
who could exist, even if it doesn't, who is able to live by the demand,
and whose prescriptions about how we should live are authoritative
for us. This postulated being is given many different names and de-
scriptions. What is typical of all these postulated beings, however, is
that they are without the usual human limitations. This pattern needs
explanation. Why should morality be presented as having this shape,
rather than what we might otherwise have expected - a purely human
institution, tied to our human conditions of limitation? I think the
overwhelmingly plausible answer is that this gap-shape is a remnant,
a relic. It is the remains of a traditional view, according to which hu-
man beings are subordinate to a divine being, who is without their
limitations and whose prescriptions about their lives they are sup-
posed to obey.
I do not want to limit this traditional view to Christianity, or even
to the three great monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity and
Islam. There is already in Aristotle the description of a gap-shaped
morality. The best life, he tells us, would be superior to the h4man
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level, but we ought not to follow the proverb writers, and 'think hu-
man, since (we) are human, or think mortal, since (we) are mortal.'
Rather, as far as we can, we ought to be immortal (NE X, 7). The gap
picture, I think, goes beyond Western culture. Chu Hsi, a Chinese
neo-Confucian of the Twelfth Century, held that for most of us our
good nature 'is like a pearl lying in muddy water', which means that
we cannot see through to the right principles. (Conversations, 4).
Now the description of the life in this moral gap, without anything
added to it, would be (Kant thinks) incoherent. This is because of an-
other feature of morality that is to be found in Kant and his descen-
dants, and in the traditional view as well. This feature can be ex-
pressed succinctly as the view that 'ought' implies 'can', though there
are some senses of' ought' where this view is incorrect. I think the
best way to put the correct view is that the question whether you
ought to do something does not arise unless you can do it. To see the
appeal of this principle, consider this example. If my son cannot yet
control his bladder, and has an accident, it is not merely stupid to
blame him, but it goes against the whole point of blaming. It is a car-
dinal principle of child-rearing that you should only hold children ac-
countable to standards that they are able to reach. And another way to
put that is to say that 'ought' implies 'can'. But then if our capacities
are really inadequate to the moral demand, it is not the case that we
ought to live by it. It is incoherent to put us under a demand we can-
not reach. Yet Kant is sure that we are under the moral demand. This
is what he calls 'the fact of reason' , and it is his axiom, his starting
point.
Christian doctrine has something to add to the gap-picture of mo-
rality to help with this difficulty. The gap-picture has three compo-
10
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nents; first, the demand, second our capacities, and third the at least
possible holy being. What Christianity adds is that the third part of
this picture (namely the at least possible holy being) intervenes in
human affairs so as to change the second part of this picture (namely
our capacities) so that they become adequate to the first part of the
picture (namely the moral demand). Just how God is supposed to do
this is the topic of another lecture. My point today is, as I already
mentioned, that this feature of Christianity has completely dropped
out of the professional literature in moral theory. But this means that
contemporary moral philosophy is faced with the threat of the inco-
herence I have just described. It has responded to this threat in essen-
tially three ways.
First, there are philosophers who exaggerate our initial capacity so
that it becomes adequate to the demand, which is held constant. One
conspicuous example is the utilitarian theorists who hold that if we
were only vividly aware of the effects of our actions on other people,
we would tend to do what morality requires. It is thus ignorance
which holds us back, they say, not any radical evil of the will. Such
theorists need to explain how it is that people who know perfectly
well how much they are harming the people affected by their actions
nevertheless persist in the most horrifying contempt and cruelty. John
Stuart Mill, the great utilitarian, thought that the twentieth century
was going to be one of moral progress through education and public
opinion, but it has been the bloodiest in human history.
The second strategy is to hold our capacities constant, and adjust
the demand downwards in order to meet it. This is typical of the type
of moral theory which diminishes the moral demand by saying that
we are not, after all, required to be impartial, and our moral obliga-
11
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tions are just to particular people, who are embedded within the spe-
cial relations we have to them as friends and family and members of
our community. We do not, for example, have moral obligations to
starving children in Africa, because they are not related to us in the
right way. This makes the moral demand much closer to our natural
tendency to restrict our care to those close to us. But theorists of this
kind have to explain our perception that we do have these moral obli-
gations outside our special relations, and that reducing the moral de-
mand in this way will make the world a worse place than it already is.
On example is that kind of evolutionary ethics which holds that the
good is the desirable, and the desirable is what humans generally de-
sire taking their history as a whole, especially during those periods of
hooting and gathering when evolution was operating on them. Think-
ing of the good this way may get us to altruism towards kin and tribe.
But it will not get us to impartial benevolence of the kind I have de-
fmed.
The third strategy is to hold both the demand and our capacities
constant, and then to try to fmd some substitute for divine assistance
in bridging the resultant gap. One example here is a different type of
evolutionary ethics, like that ofTeillard de Chardin, who thought that
our genes were going to change because the kind of aggressiveness
and tribalism we now display are no longer adaptive for us. Here
natural selection is most helpfully seen, I think, as a substitute for di-
vine assistance. But there are other candidates. Perhaps, as for Rous-
seau, love of the country given the right kind of state, will change our
capacities. Or perhaps, on the contrary, it is the withering away of the
state and giving the working class ownership of the means of produc-
tion that will give us new capacities, as Marx thought. To discuss this
12
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strategy carefully requires going through these altematives, and ex-
amining whether they work.
I need to go on to the second area I distinguished at the beginning
of this talk. The first was the picture of the moral gap. The second is
the source of the authority of morality. We can ask the question,
'Why should I be moral?', where this is not the question 'What do I
get out of being moral?', but the question 'Why should I accept the
moral demand as a demand upon me?'. Why shouldn't I go down to
the Bahamas? One response is to say that this would in the end make
me unhappy. But the present question is a different one. Why should I
keep to the moral demand, regardless of my happiness? To put this
another way, why is morality trumps?
Contemporary moral philosophy has tried various answers to this
question. One is that reason demands it. As I said earlier, Kant him-
self thought that it was the nature of reason to will universal law, and
it demands this not only in theoretical thinking about science (for ex-
ample) but in practical thinking about what to do. But he thought he
could base morality on this, and this is one place where I think his
argument fails. I cannot go into all the details here. But I think moral-
ity is not in fact exclusively universal. I think there are particular
moral obligations that we have to particular people, which are not just
obligations that anyone would have to anyone else in this sort of
situation. For example, there are duties we have to God which are not
just duties to anyone who was like God in the relevant respects. A
second difficulty is that there are universal laws which eliminate ref-
erence to the agent in the way Kant requires, but which would be im-
13
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moral to will. An example would be the homophobic principle which
prescribes hatred of all homosexuals.
Another answer we might propose is that the source of the moral
obligation is the community we belong to. We have grown up in a
community that respects the moral law, and our identity as agents is at
least in part formed by that community. Socrates says that the city is
like a parent; it has made us what we are. Perhaps to be true to our-
selves, therefore, we have to acknowledge the authority of the moral
demand which our community instilled into us. The problem with
this is that it is relativistic. I grew up in a community that was socially
stratified by class. My nanny told me that gentlemen polished the
backs of their shoes. Ordinary people polish the fronts, but only gen-
tlemen the backs. My family on my mother's side has lived in the
same enormous house for about six hundred years. But I have become
increasingly uneasy with this stratification. It does not follow from
the fact that I grew up a certain way, that I am obliged to continue
that way. The community does not have that sort of authority.
A third possibility is that nature grounds the authority of morality.
Some theorists think that you can derive normative conclusions about
how we ought to live from factual premises about what kind of people
we are and what we are naturally inclined towards. One problem with
this is that if you have a robust conception of the evil in us, then you
will think that some of the lives we naturally aim at, with power and
prestige at the heart of them, will not be good even though we do
naturally aim at them. For power and prestige are competitive goods,
in the sense that one person can only have them if other people do
not, or at least have less of them. One variant of this strategy of
founding ethics on nature is to claim that evolution can provide a
14
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foundation for ethics in the way I already mentioned. This line of
thought, which derives the good from what humans generally desire,
is not wrong to think that we do naturally desire the competitive
goods like power and prestige. But it is wrong to think that just be-
cause we generally desire them, they are good.
Finally, we might say that it is simply self-evident that morality is
authoritative. Perhaps morality is like perception. It is self-evident,
we might say, when I see a goldfinch in good light, that I am justified
in believing that there is goldfmch there. I have no objection to the
notion of perceptual beliefs like this being properly basic. If every-
thing had to be justified, then it would tum out that nothing could be.
We do have to start somewhere, and perception seems like one good
place. But the problem with this answer is that it is no help in those
cases where I do not feel the force of the moral demand. Morality is
unlike perception this way. I do not have the experience of waking up
in the morning and just not trusting my senses. But I do have the ex-
perience of moral apathy or listlessness, of simply not feeling the
authority of the moral demand. I know my duty, but I tum over and
go back to sleep.
Christianity has an answer to the question 'Why should I be
moral?' which is different from any ofthe above. It says that I should
be moral because God tells me to be so. This is the divine command
theory of ethics. In one way this is like the previous answer. For if
you ask me, 'Why should I do what God tells me to do?', I may an-
swer, 'Because God is the end or goal of everything.' But if you ask
me to justify that, I may not be able to do so, except by referring to
Scriptme and the tradition, whose authority you might not accept. So
I have ended up in the same position of starting from a premise lhave
15
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not justified. But I don't think there is anything wrong with this in
principle. And I have taken the justification a couple of steps further.
If I am indeed having difficulty being moved by my duty, it may help
to think that this is what God wants me to do. It will help if I care
about what God wants.
There is an objection that is often made to divine command the-
ory. It was made by Socrates. Paraphrasing Socrates slightly, he pres-
ents us with two options. One is that the good is good because God
wills it, and God makes it good. The other is that God wills the good
because it is good, and it is the goodness of a thing that makes God
choose it. Socrates opts for the second option: God wills the good be-
cause it is good. His argument for this is unclear, but his preference is
clearly to say that the good has an intrinsic character of its own: it is
not made good by God's willing it. The worry here is that if God did
make something good just by willing it, the good would be arbitrary;
for God could make just anything at all good in this way. I think there
is a solution to this if we see that God and we share the purpose of our
good, which is union with God. But the route to this end, which is the
second part of the Ten Commandments, is chosen by God from many
possibilities, and is good because God chooses it. If this is right, then
the dichotomy proposed in the Euthyphro dilemma is a false dichot-
omy. The good is good because God wills it and God wills it because
it is good. Kant's language is that God and we belong together in the
kingdom of which God is the head and we are merely members, and
in this kingdom we share each other's morally permitted purposes. In
particular, we share the goal of everyone being morally good and eve-
ryone being happy. But this does not always mean that I understand
how this goal is going to be reached by doing what I think God is tell-
16
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ing me to do. I have been in situations where I thought God was tell-
ing me to do something and I did not understand why God was telling
me to do it. But I believe God is not arbitrarily making the good good,
but he is choosing a route to something that I also value, to a purpose
that we share, even if! do not always understand how the route is go-
ing to get me there.
We can now go for the remainder of the talk to the third area I dis-
tinguished at the beginning. I am going to discuss the idea of moral
faith, taking the term from Kant. I have already discussed in the first
part of this paper the point that a moral agent needs to believe that she
can, over the course of her life as a whole, will what is morally good.
She has to believe that her capacities have been transformed inside
her, so to speak. Now I want to add a different point, that she has to
believe that the world outside her is the kind of place in which happi-
ness is reliably connected with a morally good life. To put this an-
other way, she needs to believe that she does not have to do what is
morally bad in order to be happy. The internal transformation is
where Christian doctrine talks about atonement and justification. For
the remainder of today' s lecture I will be talking about the external
conditions for the moral life, the agent's moral faith in Providence.
Providence is a moral order behind or within the universe, which al-
lows it to make moral sense. The moral agent who has moral faith in
Providence can foresee her happiness as reliably connected with try-
ing to do her duty and she can see this connection possibly working
for all human beings, so that the world could be a place in which eve-
ryone is both virtuous and happy. This does not mean that the moral
agent does her duty in order to be happy, or that she views her dllty as
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a means tQher happiness. This would be inconsistent with a proper
respect for morality, for she cannot really do her duty unless she does
it for its own sake. But the question for this talk is why a moral agent
should have to have this kind of moral faith in Providence at all.
What is the importance of the belief that the world is so ordered
that it is possible for every person to be both morally good and
happy? I think this possible state of the world functions for us as an
ideal, and so inspires us to engage with the world as it actually is. But
for it to function in this way as an ideal, this state of the world does
have to be possible. Consider the expression of the psalmist (85:10),
that righteousness and peace, or righteousness and shalom have
kissed each other. There is here the vision of a world in which we are
all happy; but that is too flimsy a word, if it means merely that we get
what we want. In such a world we not merely have what we want, but
what we want is what it is morally good to want. That is why it is
righteousness and peace that kiss each other. This is a vision by the
psalmist of the full kingdom of God. This vision has the power to sus-
tain us as we try to bring the actual world closer to the vision than it
now is. When we do see glimpses of the kingdom, the vision allows
us to hold them together into a pattern, and to recognize them as sig-
nificant. The possibility of the world being this way thus has a direct
impact on our moral lives.
I am going to proceed by arguing first that the moral agent has to
believe in what I will call 'self-rewarding morality', and then I will
try to show that this belief is not enough, and we need to believe in
Providence as well. Self-rewarding morality is a system in which eve-
ryone's virtue is what makes everyone happy. I will start by showing
that we do think that if we were all good, we would roughly all be
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happy. This belief is woven into the fabric of morality as we are fa-
miliar with it in our tradition, and cannot be tom out without substan-
tial damage to that fabric. Consider the two beliefs on your sheet that
the moral agent has to have about her own life. There is the belief
which I discussed in the first section of this lecture, the belief that she
can, over the course of her life as a whole, will the good. This belief
is hard to sustain because of the gap between the moral demand and
our initial capacities, but the problem is eased by the traditional doc-
trines I mentioned earlier. The second thing she has to believe, I
think, is that she can achieve most of the time, the good things she
aims at. She has to believe this, because otherwise there would be no
point in aiming at them. To make this vivid, imagine that there was an
evil genius with enormous power to manipulate our circumstances.
Suppose he brought it about that whenever we tried to do good we
ended up doing harm. I think we would stop trying to do good. There
would be no point to it. So we have to believe that the world is not
like that, and that we can actually do the good we try to do.
I think the moral agent has to have these two beliefs not only
about her own life but about the lives of other people as well. She has
to believe that they are capable of willing the good over their lives as
a whole, and that they could then achieve most ofthe time the good
things they would be aiming .at. Why does a moral agent have to be-
lieve that other people could be morally good? One answer to this is
that morality requires us to think of each other as people who could
be good people. The moral agent has, we might say, to respect other
people. This idea is contained in Kant's second version of the moral
demand which I described at the beginning. This principle does not
mean the agent has to regard other people as actually viltuoUS. Rut
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she cannot respect them if she does not regard them as capable of vir-
tue.
The other belief she has to have about other people is that she has
to believe that if everyone were virtuous, they would be able to ac-
complish most of the time, the good things they try to accomplish.
Our intentions are massively interconnected with other peoples' in-
tentions. It is hard to think of any intention I might have that does not
require me to trust that others have the ability to carry out most of
what they choose to do. Consider, for example, the intention which I
formed to write a lecture and read it at Western Michigan University.
Think of all the hundreds of other people whose intentions and ac-
tions were involved in the eventual fulfillment of this intention, the
people who made this paper and my computer, and all the drivers who
avoided my car on the highway. Then think of the hundreds of thou-
sands involved in those peoples' intentions being fulfilled. You throw
a stone into the pool and eventually the ripples reach the edge, the
whole human race.
Now if we add these two beliefs about other people together, we
get the belief in self-rewarding morality which I started with. The best
way to see this is to suppose that these two possibilities are actual-
ized. Suppose everyone not merely can be virtuous, but is virtuous;
and suppose we all not merely can achieve most of the time the good
things we aim at, but we do achieve it. Then roughly everyone will be
happy. In such a world the happiness of others is what we will all be
aiming at; and if we are achieving what we are aiming at, we will be
achieving each other's happiness. If we are collectively virtuous, on
this vision of the good, then we will collectively secure each other's
happiness. It is true that even if everyone is viltUOUS,there can still be
20
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tidal waves and atthritis and severe depression. But such natural evil
will not be, for most people, sufficient to destroy their happiness. This
is because they will be embedded in loving relationships with other
people, and surrounded with compassionate and competent care-
givers. What we have here is an idea of self-rewarding morality, be-
cause the idea is that it is everyone's virtue which results in (roughly)
everyone's happiness.
But the belief in self-rewarding morality is not enough. Here is
the turning point in this argument. We have to be able to persevere in
morality even if we do not believe that most other people are in fact
morally virtuous. We need the belief in Providence, the belief that the
world is so ordered that a person's own virtue is reliably connected
with her own happiness, whether other people are virtuous or not. I do
not know how high an estimate you make of other peoples' virtue.
My own estimate is not stable, but varies with my mood and my most
recent experience. But what can be demonstrated is that there is very
widespread gloom about the decline of virtue, and decreasing trust (at
least in the countries I know well) in the general goodwill of other
people. What is important for my present purposes is not how virtu-
ous other people actually are, or even what the general belief is about
most peoples' virtue. The important thing is that the moral agent's
commitment to morality does not depend upon her belief in the virtue
of others. Consider the fact that we try to teach our children to be
moral. We also want them to be happy. If we thought that being vir-
tuous would make them miserable, we would be more ambivalent
about teaching them virtue than we actually are. But many people
persevere in the attempt to bring up their children to be morally good
people even though they do not think their children will be living in a
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society in which most of their fellows are morally good people. If the
idea of self-rewarding morality were the only kind of moral order we
could believe in, this perseverance would be quite mysterious. What
lies behind such perseverance is surely a belief that the world is so
ordered that when their children grow up, they can be both morally
good and happy, and that this is secured not by general human virtue
but by something else. The nature of this something else is often, I
think, left indeterminate. My purpose today is just to get to this
'something else'. Eventually we need a more ambitious account of
how this kind of moral order could have been achieved.
I have said that we need this kind of moral faith if we are to per-
severe in the moral life. But it is also true that the belief in Providence
is not clearly supported by experience. This is why moral faith is the
right term here. Experience gives us all sorts of cases of morally bad
people who are to all appearances happy, and morally good people
who are to all appearances unhappy. Our experience is thus consistent
with a much bleaker picture of how the world is. This is the kind of
picture which Bernard Williams locates in the worldview of the an-
cient Greeks. He says, of Sophocles the ancient playwright, that he
represents 'human beings as dealing sensibly, foolishly, sometimes
catastrophically, sometimes nobly, with a world that is only partially
intelligible to human agency and in itself is not necessarily well ad-
justed to ethical aspirations.' He identifies this as the ancient sense of
tragedy and the vulnerability of human life to the caprice of fortune.
There is here a competitor to moral faith, and a much darker picture
of our destiny. Actually, I think Williams is wrong about both
Sophocles. He is reading Nietzsche back into the ancient world, be-
cause he finds the Nietzschean picture congenial himself. But I will
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not get into that here. He does present us with an alternative to moral
faith, and that is what is impOltant for now, rather than his historical
judgment.
This ancient sense of tragedy has a certain appeal. It can seem that
Sisyphus shaking his fist at heaven has certain nobility. By contrast, it
can seem that the moral faith in Providence is a bit weak-kneed or
lily-livered. It is the hope that the universe fits our moral aspirations,
and this can seem a kind of self-gratifying fantasy, a failure to look
harsh reality fully in the face. It can seem that only a fool or a bigot or
a weakling would go on believing that the world is so ordered that we
can trust that if we meet the moral demand we will be happy.
Here I think it is relevant to look at the lives of those who have
experienced great evil, and have yet persevered in their faith in God.
What do these lives show us? That the experts in the experience of
evil have not always found that this evidence forces them to reject
their faith. I talked with a woman named Eva while I was writing my
book The Moral Gap who was a survivor from the concentration
camps of World Warn. She said that her experience was that those
who went into the camps with a strong faith in God came out, ifthey
came out at all, with their faith stronger. It is not that they understood
why God permitted the suffering, but that their faith in him is what
held them and kept them through it. Eva was Jewish, and I do not
know whether she believed in an afterlife or not. My sense is that she
did not. But she did have a basic attitude oftrust that God was in
charge; and that the good was more fundamental in the world than the
evil in it, and would in the end win. There is a large biographical and
autobiographical literature here. Elie Wiesel, for example, says that
he has been angry with God, and has not answered the question of
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why God allowed the Holocaust. But he claims to have become closer
to God through his protest. It is important that the lives of people like
Eva are admirable. Their lives carry conviction. They have a reading
of the enormous evil which they experience. This is not merely logi-
cally consistent with their faith (though that is important to argue).
My point is, rather, that this reading lies behind lives which are obvi-
ously praiseworthy, whose goodness it would be perverse to deny.
There is a difficulty here, that we have to avoid begging the question.
The sceptic will resist the notion of obvious goodness. I am thinking
of Christopher Hitchens who was at Oxford with me, and wrote a
book trying to show that Mother Teresa was a fraud and a fascist. He
has devoted his life to finding the worm in every bud. But I am con-
tent to rest on the claim that there is such a thing as an obviously good
life, even though not everyone will agree about every case; and I want
to add the claim that such lives will tend to be familiar with suffering,
and to display what I have called moral faith.
I will end with one instructive case, that of Ivan and Alyosha in
Dostoyevsky's Brothers Karamazov. Ivan tells the story of the Grand
Inquisitor, which is often used in philosophy textbooks as the para-
digm case of the argument against faith in Providence. Ivan ends up,
after telling a number of horrifying stories of evil, saying to God that
he respectfully returns him the ticket. But we have to ask what Dos-
toyevsky is doing in putting this powerful section in the mouth of
Ivan, with Alyosha as its audience. The philosophy textbooks take the
passage out of its context, and miss its point. What happens to these
two brothers? Ivan, who does not fudge either the moral demand or
his own radical incapacity, ends the book by going crazy and holding
conversation with the devil. Alyosha ends the book declaring his faith
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to a circle of adoring children. Dostoyevsky is trying to show us
something. TIle story of the Grand Inquisitor is powerful, but it is not
decisive. The life ofIvan, who is a man in the moral gap but without
moral faith, is doomed; but the life of Alyosha, who retains his faith
without pretending that evil does not exist, is bound for glory. We can
see in his life the character of the full kingdom of God towards which
he is headed.
What I have shown, if my argument has worked, is that morality
requires the moral faith in Providence in the fonn of the strong belief
that virtue is consistent with happiness whether other people as a gen-
eral rule are virtuous or not. The next step would be to ask what is the
mechanism of Providence. How is it supposed to work? All I have
argued so far is that we need the belief in something more than the
virtue of other people. But what could this 'something more' be? This
is where the Christian doctrines come in about God's work on our
behalf. I have not tried today to prove these doctrines true; but I have
tried to show you, so to speak, the space for them: where they are
needed in a satisfying analysis of the moral life. Suppose we do not
want to change the picture of the moral gap significantly. We want to
preserve a high moral demand, and we want to be realistic about our
natural capacities. Then if we want to drop the theology, we will have
to find a substitute to do the same job. It is not going to be easy to
find one.
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